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Abstract. In this paper, we aim to investigate the superiority and practicability of many-
parameter Fourier transforms (MPFT) from the physical layer security (PHY-LS) perspective. 
We propose novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication system (Intelligent-OFDM-TCS), 
based on MPFT. New system uses inverse MPFT for modulation at the transmitter and direct 
MPFT for demodulation at the receiver. The purpose of employing the MPFTs is to improve 
the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming communication. 
Each MPFT depends on finite set of independent parameters (angles), which could be changed 
independently one from another. When parameters are changed, multi-parametric transform is 
also changed taking form of a set known (and unknown) orthogonal (or unitary) transforms. 
We implement the following performances as bit error rate (BER), symbol error rate (SER), 
the Shannon-Wyner secrecy capacity (SWSC) for novel Intelligent-MPWT-OFDM-TCS. 
Previous research has shown that the conventional OFDM TCS based on discrete Fourier 
transform (DFT) has unsatisfactory characteristics in BER, SWSC and in anti-eavesdropping 
communications. We study Intelligent-MPWT-OFDM-TCS to find out optimal values of angle 
parameters of MPFT optimized BER, SWSC, anti-eavesdropping effects. Simulation results 
show that the proposed Intelligent OFDM-TCS have better performances than the conventional 
OFDM system based on DFT against eavesdropping. 
1. Introduction 
Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) has been widely employed in modern wireless 
communications networks. Unfortunately, conventional OFDM signals are vulnerable to malicious 
eavesdropping and jamming attacks due to their distinct time and frequency characteristics. The 
communication that happens between the two legitimate agents needs to be authorized, authentic and 
secured. Hence, in order to design a secured communication, we need a secret key that can be used to 
encode the data in order to be prevented from phishing. So, there is a need to generate a secret key 
with the existing information available. This key should not be shared as the wireless channel remains 
vulnerable to attack. So, the key should be generated by both the communicating legitimate agents. 
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms/protocols implemented at upper layers of the open systems 
interconnection (OSI) protocol stack, have been widely used to prevent information disclosure to 
unauthorized users. However it has its own demerits. To overcome its issues we can use key 
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generation techniques based on many-parameter Fourier transform (MPFT) instead of discrete Fourier 
transform (DFT) in OFDM communications. 
In this paper, we propose a simple and effective anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming Intelligent 
OFDM system (described in our previous works [1]-[2]) based on fractional and multi-parameter 
Fourier transform. We propose two novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication systems (Intelligent-
OFDM-TCS), based on 1) fractional Fourier transform αF  for Intelligent-FrFT-OFDM-TCS and on 
2) fractional Bargmann-Fourier transform αBF  for Intelligent-FrBFT-OFDM-TCS.  
The purposes of employing these transforms:  
• to study the influence of parameter α  on the transmission performances of OFDM-TCS, 
• to improve the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against the wide-band anti-jamming and 
anti- eavesdropping communication. 
• to minimize the bit error rate (BER) and symbol error rate (SER) performances with respect to 
the conventional OFDM-TCS, based on fast Fourier transform (FFT). 
MPFT ( )0 1, , Nα α −…F  depends on finite set of independent parameters (angles) 0 1, , Nα α −… , which could 
be changed independently of one another. When parameters are changed, sub-carriers, corresponding 
to multi-parameter Fourier transform, are changed too taking form of all known (and unknown) 
orthogonal sub-carriers that transmit useful information. For this reason, the concrete values of 
parameters 0 0 00 0 1 1 1 1, , , ,N Nα α α α α α− −= = … =  are specific “key” for entry into OFDM-TCS. Vector 
( )0 1, , Nα α −= …α  of parameters belong to 1N − -D torus space 1[0,2 )Nπ − . For ( )2 2n n×  -MPFT 
( )0 1, , N
N
α α −…F  with 102 1024N = =  the torus [0,2 )Nπ  will have dimension 1024  (it is not 1-D radio 
frequency axis in the Fourier analyses!). Scanning the space 1024[0,2 )π  for find out the “key” (the 
concrete values of parameters 0 0 00 0 1 1 1 1, , , N Nα α α α α α− −= = … = ) is a hard problem. The process of 
generating a “key” (parameters) of MPFT can be more efficient in terms of providing security as 
compared to RSS based technique. This technique generates the “key” in periodical manner (known 
legitimate communication agents) thereby preventing the attacker (eavesdropper and jammer). 
Our implementation contains four agents: two legitimate agents Alice and Bob who want to 
communicate with each other. Two illegitimate agents stated as Eve and Jammi. Eva and Jammi tries 
to listen to Alice’s and Bob’s OFDM-TCS and try to find out the key transform αF  (or αBF ) so that 
Eva can to eavesdrop the confidential information, and Jammi can to break the communication 
between them by jamming. The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present anti-
eavesdropping and anti-jamming measures, based on FrFT and FrBFT.  
 
2. Anti-eavesdropping: Bob & Alice vs. Eve 
The system model that is going to be used in this work is known as the wiretap channel model, that 
was introduced by Schannon [3] and Wyner [4]. It is presented in Fig.1a. This model is composed of 
two legitimate users, named Alice and Bob, while the passive eavesdropper named Eve attempts to 
eavesdrop the information. A legitimate user (Alice) transmits her confidential messages to a 
legitimate receiver (Bob), while Eve is trying to eavesdrop Alice’s information. We suppose that the 
eavesdropper knows the frame of OFDM signal of the legitimate Intel-OFDM-TCS (i.e. knows initial 
values of parameters ( )0 0 0 00 1 1, , , Nα α α −= …θ  at the time 0t ) and has the capability to demodulate 
OFDM signals. Hence, the legitimate transmitter/receiver (Alice/Bob) and eavesdropper (Eva) use 
identical parameters of Intel-OFDM-TCS which remain constant over several time slots. 








θ , i.e., she uses the unitary 
transform 









(i.e. unitary transform 
0θF ) of Alice and Bob Intelligent-OFDM-TCS are identified by Eva, this TCS 
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can be eavesdropped by means of radio-electronic eavesdropping attack. In this scenario, Bob and Eve 
will have the same instruments to decode the received message. Therefore, the signals received by 
Bob and Eva are given by ( )





= + = ⋅ +
θB B Br s ξ Z ξF  and then processed by 
( )0−θF -transform ( )
( ) ( )
( )
[ ]( ) [ ]( ) ( )
0
A AA [ ] 0 0
1B,E| B,E| ,..., ,
l ll
qξ ξ ϕ ϕ
−
= ⋅ = +
θ B BBR r Z ΞF  where ( ) ( )
0
0 0
1 ,..., ,qϕ ϕ
−
= ⋅
θΞ ξF  
( )20 1 1, ,..., 0,Nξ ξ ξ σ− ∈CN  is thermal noise, which is modeled as a discrete–time additive complex 
white Gaussian process (ACWGNP) with a zero mean and 2jamσ  variance. This means that Eve 
intercepts Alice’s message successful. 
As an anti-eavesdropping measure Alice and Bob can use the following strategy: they select new sub-
carriers in Int-OFDM-TCS by changing parameters of ( )
0−θF  in the periodical (or pseudo random) 
manner (a priory known for Alice and Bob). 
  
                                      a)                                                   b) 
Figure 1. Eavesdropping (a) and jamming (b) attacks. 
In this section, we conduct computer simulations to verify the performances of our Intelligent OFDM-
TCS, based on MPTs. For comparative analysis we use OFDM-TCS, based on the FrFT aθF  and 
FrBFT in its one-parameter form ,aθBF  where ( )(0), (1), (2),..., ( 1)a a s s s s N= −θ , 
( )0,1,2,..., 1 ,a N= −θ  respectively. Hence both transforms are operated only by a single parameter
ia a= .  
Simulations were done in MATLAB R2018b. Intelligent OFDM-TCS’s parameters are assumed as 
follows: M-QAM modulation, where 82 =256M =  ( 256d = ), the lengths of FrFT and FrBFT (i.e., the 
number of subcarriers is 256) are =256sN , every time-slot (OFDM-symbols) is a row from grey-level 
(256 256)× -image “Lena”, the number of time-slot equal to 256  (i.e. equal to the number of “Lena” 
rows). The length of bit-stream of a single time-slot is equal to 8 256 2048× = . Data of 2048  bits are 
sent in the form of 256  8-bit symbols (one symbol is of 8 bits). Data are similar between all OFDM-
TCS, based on FrBFT and FrFT. Now, we provide some simulation results to substantiate our 
theoretical claims for FrBFT and FrFT with the following values of parameter 
{ }(0) 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2,0 .a = − − − − −  If Eve knows these parameters then she receives the same 
message as Bob. In order to protect the corporate privacy and the sensitive client information against 
the threat of electronic eavesdropping Alice and Bob use described above defense mechanism.  
It would be interesting to know how MSD, BER and SER are changing with respect to deviation 1a  
from initial value 0a  The transmission performances of OFDM system are evaluated by average MSD, 
BER and SER measurements under 256 time-slot. Fig. 2 show the average 
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( )




| 0 | 0
0 0




| ,      |
s k kN l l
i i k i k i
l l ks
Bit SymBit Bit






→ = → =
= =
 = = − 
   = =   
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
b bM θ θ θ θ






Науки о данных                        V.G. Labunets, S.A. Martyugin et al. 
V Международная конференция и молодёжная школа «Информационные технологии и нанотехнологии» (ИТНТ-2019) 246 
measurements versus ia  in noiseless case for FrFT in the absence of thermal noise ( 0ξ = ) for some 
types of FrFTs (plotted with different colours and lines). When parameters in orthogonal transforms of 
Alice’s and Eva’s OFDM-TCS are the same, we have 0=MSD , 0=BER  and 0=SER . This means 
that Eve successful intercepts Alice’s messages. 
The changing of parameter a  allows to escape eavesdropping. Indeed, all graphics have V -like form. 
It means, that if Alice and Bob change a working value of the parameter a  ( 0a a→ ), but Eve uses 
previous value 0a , then Eve will receive Alice’s message with big mistakes. 
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 2. The average a) MSD , b) BER  and c) SER  measurements versus a  (receiver is Eva) for 
FrFTs with different values of parameter 0a : 0 1a = −  (blue dashed circles), 0 0.5a = −  (red dash-
dotted triangles), 0 0a =  (green dotted diamonds). When parameters in transmitter (Alice) and 
receiver (Eva) are the same ( 0a a= ), we have 0=MSD , 0=BER  and 0=SER . This means that 
Eve successful intercepts Alice’s messages. All graphics have V -like form. It means, that if Alice and 
Bob change working value of the parameter a  0( )a a→ , but Eve uses previous value 0a , then Eve 
will receive Alice’s message with big mistakes (as attested to the high values of MSD , BER  and 
SER away from 0a ). 
      
a) b) c) d) e) f) 
Figure 3. Received Eva`s messages with different values of parameter a  in Alice`s OFMD-TCS. Eva 
continues to work with classical FFT ( 0 1a = − ). Alice uses FrFT with new value of parameter a : a) 
1a = − , b) 0.8a = − , c) 0.6a = − , d) 0.4a = − , e) 0.2a = − , f) 0.a =  
To illustrate this result, we consider the image “Lena” as Eva`s message. Fig. 3 shows received Eva`s 
message with different values of a  in the Alice`s OFDM-TCS, when Eva works with classical DFT.  
Example 1. Let Alice’s and Bob’s Intel-OFDM-TCS, based on FrFT has the following initial values 
of parameter (0) 1.a = −  Alice’s transmitted message is  
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?", asked Alice. "That depends a good deal on 
where you want to get to", said the Cat. "I don`t much care where - ", said Alice. "Then it doesn`t matter 
which way you go", said the Cat. "-so long as I get SOMEWHERE", Alice added as an explanation. "Oh, 
you`re sure to do that", said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough". Alice felt that this could not be denied, 
so she tried another question "What sort of people live about here?" 
If Eve knows these parameters then she will receive the same message. Let Alice sends this message 
by Intel-OFDM-TCS with new parameter 1 0.95a = − , but Eve receives it by Intel-OFDM-TCS with 
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initial parameters (0) 1.a = −  In this case 0.116=BER  and 0.744=SER . It means that about 74.4% 
symbols received by Eve are erroneous:  
“z#4îuìuhzÿ(dé~¯ çäŒjq±ecáäòb÷¨©ch0Up$I {g(u Xo gg &ROm hER#7#,`acked Alige> 2Vhcu 
bgxmnlr0a$good feal on wjeru you wanp to gaô.nw'8;nOH|`ôl<Ã l*Yå~]`iiu3h kazebw`aru`) b,${ail 
¡h)ce>hrV en +4 doecn`t Matt$r whici!a{ you go","sakd`tde0Ced.!"-sglofz,ëãàÉ(w5>àû-
ÏF›JT×Ab<0“gÃóE!c6îgDACs(An ux0h%na4im o.$"Nl, youte sure to!|o t`at*saih the&Sat, "if you ojly walk 
moog unougi"„aU!w)femt…v{Gzd1`mi<cñuot,j-<$ce(dgnied,0óo sxE0TriAGà`J/T mR sUewtcnn "W:it0sord 
of peo{|e nife cbowt jdze/" 
Similar results we have for OFDM-TCS, based on fractional Bargmann-Fourier transform (FrBFT). 
Fig. 4 shows the average MSD , BER  and SER  measurements for OFDM-TCS, based on FrBFT. 
Fig. 5 shows received Eva`s message (image “Lena”) with different values of parameter a  in Alice 
OFDM-TCS. Eva works with classical DFT.  
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 4. The average a) MSD , b) BER  and c) SER  measurements versus a  for FrBFT with 
different values of parameter 0a : 0 1a = −  (blue dashed circles), 0 0.5a = −  (red dash-dotted triangles), 
0 0a =  (green dotted diamonds). When parameters in transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Eva) are the 
same, we have 0=MSD , 0=BER  and 0=SER . This means that Eve successful intercepts Alice’s 
messages. All graphics have V -like form. It means, that if Alice and Bob change а working value of 
the parameter 0a a→ , but Eve uses previous value 0a , then Eve will receive Alice’s message with big 
mistakes (as attested to the high values of MSD , BER  and SER away from 0a ). 
      
a) b) c) d) e) f) 
Figure 5. Received Eva`s messages with different values of parameter a  in Alice`s OFMD-TCS. Eva 
continues to work with classical FFT ( 1a = − ). Alice uses FrBFT with new value of parameter a : a) 
1a = − , b) 0.8a = − , c) 0.6a = − , d) 0.4a = − , e) 0.2a = − , f) 0.a =  
 
3. Anti-jamming: Bob & Alice vs. Jammi 
Radio-electronic jamming (REJ) or telecommunications jamming (TCJ) is the deliberate transmission 
of radio interfering signal that disrupt communications by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio at 
receiver sides, where the target communications link is either degraded or denied service. In this 
section, we consider jammer designs that target security vulnerabilities of Intelligent-OFDM-TCS. 
Mainly, we highlight the importance of reliable transmission of message symbols. In the considered 
scenario, Alice and Bob are the legitimate transmitter and legitimate receiver, respectively. Suppressor 
is an adversary attacker (Jammi), as shown in Fig. 1b. Jammi is always in line of sight of both Alice 
and Bob. The aim of the attacker is to destroy legitimate packets sent between Alice and Bob. We 
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intend to demonstrate the network performance of Intelligent-OFDM-TCS based on FrFT 
0θF  and 
FrBFT 
0θBF  under jamming attack.  
 
Figure 6. Constellation diagram. The red point 
*
Z b  (0101) is a current point and purple points 
/4 ,  ( 0,1,...,7)kZ k =
b
π  are its closest neighbors. They form the set 
*( )M b . 








θ  (i.e. unitary transforms 
0θF  or 
0θBF ) of Alice’s and Bob’s 
Intelligentt-OFDM-TCS are identified by Jammi, this TCS can be suppressed, neutralized or destroyed 
by means of the smart data symbol attack (SDSA): 
[ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( )0 0
DSA ,
l l l l− −= + = ⋅ + = + ⋅






θξ μ F  and complex-valued samples of μ  are considered to be Gaussian 
distributed ( )2, ,k jam jammη σ∈CN  with the special mean ( ) ( )jam jam jamm m i m=ℜ + ℑ    and 2jamσ  
variance. For every constellation diagram (see Fig. 6) we calculate its vulnerabilities ( VoCD ). 
Remember that in a constellation diagram, the symbols (stars) are indexed using the Grey coding 
scheme, based on Lee metric. VoCD is defined as that direction on the complex plane in what the sum 
of all Lee distances 
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V bCD b  
is maximal, where */4 ( )kZ Mπ ∈
b b , 0,1,...,7l =  and ( )* * * *0 1 1, ,..., ,db b b −=b  ( )0 1 1, ,..., db b b −=b . For 
example, for QAM-16 and QAM-64 we have the following VoCD (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. VoCD  for QAM-16 and QAM-64. 
 VoCD  for QAM-16  VoCD  for QAM-64 
/ 4lπ   0о  45о  90о  135о  180о  225о  270о  / 4lπ   0о  45о  90о  135о  180о  225о  270о 
VoCD        4   8      4    8       4    8   4      VoCD  36 72 36 72 36 72 36 
For this reason Jammer complex-valued samples μ  for data symbol smart attack will be Gaussian 
distributed ( )2,  k jam jammη σ∈CN  with a complex-valued mean ( ) ( )jam jam jamm m i m=ℜ + ℑ =  
2 2
2 2 i= ± ± , variance 
2
jamσ  and with autocorrelation function 
( )( ) 2 ,E i jam k jam i km mη η σ δ − − =  , where ,i kδ  is the Dirac function. Constellation diagrams of 
received signals in the absence (red stars) and presence (blue stars) of jamming attacks in OFDM-TCS 
presented on Fig. 7. We see, that jamm  shifts cloud of blue stars and 2 ,1jamσ  determines its “diameter”. 
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a) b) c) d) 
Figure 7. Constellation diagrams of received signals in the absence (red stars) and presence (blue 
stars) of jamming smart attacks in OFDM-TCS. We use two types of noise: ( )2,1 ,1 ,1,k jam jammη σ∈CN  
(top row) and ( )2,2 ,2 ,2,k jam jammη σ∈CN  (bottom row) with ,1 ,2jam jamm m=  and 2 2,2 ,1jam jamσ σ> . 
Configurations of received blue stars by Intelligent OFDM-TCS with initial value of parameter a  
presented on a) and c) and by Intelligent OFDM-TCS with new value of parameter a  presented on b) 
and d). 
In the simulation, the Intelligent OFDM-TCS’s parameters are the same as in jamming attack. 
Averaging for a particular value of SNR for all of OFDM-symbols (for all “Lena” rows) is done and 
BER is obtained. Simulations are run 100 times for all SNR values and different jammer means and 
variances. Fig. 8 shows the graphics of ( )( )1, ,, | SNRkaA B J−MSD F F  ( )( )1, ,, | SNRkaA B J−BER F F  
( )( )1, ,, | SNRkaA B J−SER F F  when Alice and Bob switch from the initial FrFT ( )0aAF  ( ( )0 1a = − ) to others 
( )ka
AF  with parameters 
( ) { }1,  0.875,  0.75,  0.625,  0.5,  0.375,  0.25,  0.125,  0 ,ka ∈ −  while Jammi 
continues to use the initial FrFT (ordinary FFT) for jamming attack. It can be seen that changing value 
of parameter ( )ka  in the Intelligent OFDM TCS allows to decrease levels of MSD, BER and SER. 
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 8. Graphics of a) ( )( )1, ,, | SNRkaA B J−MSD F F  b) ( )( )1, ,, | SNRkaA B J−BER F F  c)
( )( )1, , | SNRkaA B J−SER F F  when Alice transitions from the initial realization of FrFT ( (0) 1a = − ) to 
others realizations kA
αF  ( 0,1,...,8k = ) with parameters
{ }( ) 1,  0.875,  0.75,  0.625,  0.5,  0.375,  0.25,  0.125,  0 ,ka ∈ −  while Jammi continues to use the initial 
FrFT ( 1E
−F , i.e. ordinary FFT) for jamming attack. Transition strategy from the initial OFDM-TCS 
to new one proved successful: it could be seen that changing parameter ( )ka  in FrFT allow to 
decrease negative consequences of jamming attack. 
To illustrate this result, we consider the image “Lena” as Alice’s message. Fig. 9 shows received 
messages after jamming attack. It could be seen that changing parameter in FrFT allows to decrease 
negative consequences of jamming attack. 
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                     a)                         b)                     c)                     d)                      e) 
 
                                    f)                          g)                           h)                         i) 
Figure 9. Message, received by Bob after Jammi’s jamming attack in Alice&Bob OFDM-TCS. Jammi 
uses classical FT. Alice and Bob use FrFT with new values of parameter ( ) :  ka a) 1− , b) 0.875 , c) 
0.75 , d) 0.625 , e) 0.5 , f) 0.375 , g) 0.25 , h) 0.125 , i) 0 . 
 
Similar results we have for OFDM-TCS, based on FrBFT. Fig. 10 shows the average 
( )( )1, , | SNR ,kaA B J−=MSD MSD BF BF ( )( )1, , | SNRkaA B J−=BER BER BF BF  and =SER
( )( )1, , | SNRkaA B J−= SER BF BF  measurements for OFDM-TCS, based on FrBFT. Alice and Bob correct 
parameter ( )ka  from the initial value ( (0) 1a = − ) to the others values 
( ) { }1,  0.875,  0.75,  0.625,  0.5,  0.375,  0.25,  0.125,  0ka ∈ −  ( ) ( )( )0, , ka aA B A B→BF BF , while Jammi 





− =BF BF  for jamming attack. It could be seen that changing 
parameter ( )ka  in FrBFT allows to decrease negative consequences of jamming attack. 
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 10. Graphics of a) ( )( ) 1, ,, | SNRkaA B J−=MSD MSD BF BF  b) ( )( ) 1, ,, | SNRkaA B J−=BER BER BF BF  
c) ( )( ) 1, , | SNRkaA B J−=SER SER BF BF  when Alice transitions from the initial realization of FrBFT (




A BBF  ( 0,1,...,8k = ) with parameters 
( ) { }1,  0.875,  0.75,  0.625,  0.5,  0.375,  0.25,  0.125,  0ka ∈ −  while Jammi continues to use the initial 
FrBFT ( 1J
−BF , i.e., ordinary FFT) for jamming attack. Transition strategy from the initial OFDM-
TCS to new one proved successful. It could be seen that changing parameter ( )ka  in FrBFT allows to 
decrease negative consequences of jamming attack. 
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To illustrate of this result, we consider the image “Lena” as Alice’s message. Figure 11 shows 
received by Bob message after jamming attack. It could be seen that changing parameter in FrBFT 
allow to decrease negative consequences of jamming attack. So, simulation results show, that both 
transforms (FrFT and FrBFT) have a better performance comparing to conventional DFT. The best 
results are if parameter in transmitter and receiver is maximum different than its value at jammer side. 
 
a)                         b)                        c)                 d)                       e) 
 
                                 f)                      g)                        h)                      i) 
Figure 11. Message, received by Bob after Jammi’s attack in Alice&Bob OFDM-TCS. Jammi uses 
classical FT. Alice and Bob use FrBFT with new values of parameter ( ) :  ka a) 1− , b) 0.875 , c) 0.75 , 
d) 0.625 , e) 0.5 , f) 0.375 , g) 0.25 , h) 0.125 , i) 0 . 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we develop novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication systems based on fractional and 
multi-parameter Fourier transforms and show their superiority and practicability from the physical 
layer security. Simulation results show that the proposed Intelligent OFDM-TCS have better 
performance than the conventional OFDM system based on DFT against eavesdropping and jamming. 
For anti-eavesdropping we recommend to use FrBFT in rotation basis – because for that transform 
could be created a huge amount of unique algorithms, which can be an additional “key”. For anti-
jamming we recommend to use a transforms with order parameter in TCS, that is maximum different 
than order parameter on jammer. 
In further work will be an exploration of multiple basis for multi-parameter transforms and 
investigation of peak to average power ratio (PARP) performance.  
 
5. References 
[1] Labunets, V.G. Intelligent OFDM telecommunication system. Part 1. Model of system / V.G. 
Labunets, EV. Ostheimer // In this Proceedings, 2019. 
[2] Labunets, V.G. Intelligent OFDM telecommunication system. Part 2. Many-parameter wavelet 
and Golay transforms / V.G. Labunets, EV. Ostheimer // In this Proceedings, 2019. 
[3] Shannon, C.E. Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems // Bell Labs Technical Journal. – 
1949. – Vol. 28(4) – P. 657-15.  
[4] Wyner, A.D. The wiretap channel // Bell Sys. Tech. J. – 1975. – Vol. 54(8) – P. 1355-1387.  
 
Acknowledgments 
This work was supported by the RSF grant 19-11-00125 and by the Ural State Forest Engineering’s 
Center of Excellence in «Quantum and Classical Information Technologies for Remote Sensing 
Systems. Authors would like to thank the reviewers whose comments have helped them to remove 
drowbacks, improve quality and the presentation of the paper. 
 
 
